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ARTICLES
ACCOMMODATING INDIAN RELIGIONS: THE
PROPOSED 1993 AMENDMENT TO THE
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
Michael J. Simpson*
INTRODUCTION
In two cases decided in 1988 and 1990, Lyng v. Northwest In-
dian Cemetery Protective Ass'n1 and Employment Division of Or-
egon v. Smith,2 the United States Supreme Court severely re-
stricted the protective scope of the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 In Lyng and
Smith, the Court overruled more than twenty-five years of prece-
dent by holding that government action that creates an incidental
burden on the free exercise of religion need not be justified by a
"compelling state interest" which cannot be served by less restric-
tive means.4 Indeed, after Lyng and Smith, religious claimants
* Indian Law attorney, Legal Aid Society, Walthill, Nebraska. B.S., University of South
Dakota, 1989; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1992. The author wishes to thank
James Botsford, Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Jeffrey A. Green, and Lori Simpson for their valua-
ble support and advice.
1. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3. In part, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 485 U.S. at 452-53; 494 U.S. at 886 n.3. Since the early 1960s, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the free exercise clause mandates that religious practices inci-
dentally burdened by government agents must be justified by a compelling state interest.
See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (holding
state laws burdening religions "must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified
only by proof by the State of a compelling interest"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972) (holding "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963) (stating that the question is "whether some compelling state interest . ..
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right"). Even when a
compelling government interest is present, the Supreme Court has ruled that the regulation
1
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must prove that government actors intended to punish the claim-
ants' particular religions-a virtually impossible standard to
meet-in order to invoke the protections of the free exercise
clause. In addition, in the 1987 case of O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz,5 the Court similarly restricted the free exercise clause as
it applies to prisoners, essentially leaving prisoners' religious rights
to the unfettered discretion of prison officials.
The Court's recent restriction of First Amendment protection
is unfortunate, since the compelling interest test has been essential
to the continued existence of often unorthodox or unpopular "mi-
nority religions." Government policies are commonly insensitive or
hostile to these faiths, and have occasionally been overruled in the
courts. For instance, in 1963, the Supreme Court in Sherbert v.
Verner7 held that a Seventh Day Adventist could not be denied
unemployment benefits after being fired for a religiously-motivated
refusal to work on Saturdays, since the state could not justify its
action with a compelling interest.8 Additionally, in 1972, the Court
held in Wisconsin v. Yoder' that a group of Amish children, whose
parents' religious beliefs were incompatible with formal secondary
education, should be exempted from state compulsory education
laws because of the absence of a compelling state interest. 10
Similarly, Native American1" religious groups, 2 as minority re-
on religious conduct must be the least restrictive alternative to achieve that interest. See,
e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-56 (1981);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
5. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
6. The Court in Smith recognized this, noting that "leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in ...." Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. One commentator has written that "[tihe
smaller and more unconventional the religion, the more likely it is that some statute or
administrative rule will interfere seriously with that religion, either by accident or design. If
anything, small insular sects need the protection of religious exemptions more than well-
known, traditional religions." David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Ac-
tion, 40 EMORY L.J. 77, 101 (1991).
7. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
8. See also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 (holding that the state could not deny unem-
ployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit weapons manufacturing job because of
religious beliefs).
9. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
10. Id. at 214-15.
11. The terms "Indian" and "Native American" are used interchangeably in this arti-
cle. Generally, in federal Indian law, the definition of an Indian varies from statute to stat-
ute. Some federal statutes defer to tribal determinations of membership. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.
§ 450b(d) (1988) (defining Indian in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assis-
tance Act of 1975 as "a person who is a member of an Indian tribe"). Others impose addi-
tional requirements such as blood quanta or dispense with the requirement of tribal mem-
bership altogether. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988) (defining Indian under the Indian
Reorganization Act to include "all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recog-
2
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ligions without an effective voice in the American political pro-
cess,13 must rely almost exclusively on the free exercise clause for
protection of their religious rights, since federal statutes (such as
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 ("AIRFA"))1'
designed to accommodate Indian religions have not proven ade-
quate. Thus, the evisceration of the free exercise clause in Lyng,"5
nized Indian tribe... [and] all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood"); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1152-53 (1988) and 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) (federal statutes dealing with criminal jurisdic-
tion and social services programs, respectively, which use the term Indian without specifi-
cally limiting it to tribal members). See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 19-27 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (discussing definition of Indian).
The proposed 1993 amendment discussed in this article defines an Indian as "an indi-
vidual of aboriginal ancestry who is a member of an Indian tribe or any individual who is an
Alaska Native." In addition, the amendment has a special definition for California Indians.
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESOLUTION (DISCUSSION DRAFT) 2-3 (on file at Native
American Rights Fund) [hereinafter DISCUSSION DRAFT].
12. For general information about traditional Native American religions, see generally
JOSEPH E. BROWN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1982); AKE HULTKRANTZ,
THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1979); SEEING WITH A NATIVE EYE (Walter H.
Capps ed., 1976); TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH (Dennis Tedlock & Barbara
Tedlock eds., 1975); VINE DELORIA, GOD IS RED (1973).
Although substantial differences exist between the various tribal religions, some gener-
alizations about traditional Native American religions are possible. First, traditional Native
American religions are pervasive, giving all aspects of Indian life a spiritual significance.
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988) (the Indian Civil Rights Act, while imposing most of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights upon tribes, makes an exception for the Establishment
Clause due to a conscious recognition that government and religion are inextricably interwo-
ven in some tribes); BROWN, supra, at 69:
What we refer to as religion cannot, in the case of the American Indian, be sepa-
rated from the forms and dynamics of everyday life, or from almost any facet of
the total culture; nor, as we shall see more clearly, may there be separation from
the phenomena of the natural environment.
Second, Native American religions differ profoundly from most major world religions in
their attitudes toward history. Most major world religions are "commemorative" as a sub-
stantial portion of their religion deals with commemorating sacred events of the past. FED-
ERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT 8 (1979)
[hereinafter AIRFA REPORT]. Native American religions, however, are "continuing" as their
ceremonies and rituals deal with the ongoing interaction between the tribe and the natural
world it inhabits. AIRFA REPORT, supra, at 10. Finally, Native American religions are fun-
damentally inconsistent with at least one major world religion, Christianity, in their concep-
tualization of the relationship between mankind and the environment. Native American re-
ligions have a more profound appreciation of the interdependence of all living things.
Further, Indian rituals and ceremonies are seen as necessary to ensure the continuing health
of "Mother Earth." F. Scott Momaday, NATIVE AMERICAN ATTITUDES TO THE ENVIRONMENT,
in SEEING WITH A NATIVE EY, supra note 12; HULTKRANTZ, supra, at 44, 104-05. In contrast,
Christianity generally distinguishes between mankind and the natural environment. For ex-
ample, Genesis 1:26-28 states that -man should "have dominion over" and "subdue" the
earth. See DELORIA, supra, at 91-109.
13. Native Americans make up less than one half of one percent of the total United
States population. DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 6 (2d
ed. 1986) (based on 1980 census).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
15. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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Smith,"6 and O'Lone'7 leaves Native American religious practices
especially vulnerable to insensitive government officials.
In response to Lyng, Smith, and O'Lone, an amendment to
the AIRFA is expected to be proposed in early 1993 to provide
additional protection for Native American sacred sites, the sacra-
mental use of peyote by members of the Native American Church,
the religious use of eagle parts and feathers by Native Americans,
and the religious rights of Native American prisoners.'8 This
amendment will be the fifth attempt to strengthen the AIRFA in
as many years 9 and has strong support from Indian tribes20 and
other groups.2" The proposed amendment, however, is expected to
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
18. The American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution (the proposed amendment)
has four titles. Title I, designed to protect sacred sites, reinstates the compelling interest
test whenever a governmental action "is posing or will pose a substantial and realistic threat
of undermining or frustrating a Native American religion" and requires notice and consulta-
tion with appropriate Indian tribes and traditional leaders before a federal or federally-
assisted undertaking which may change the character or use of a sacred site may continue.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 11, at 8-23. Title II creates a legislative exemption to all
federal, state and local laws proscribing the use, possession, or transportation of peyote to
be used sacramentally by Native Americans. DIscussIoN DRAFT, supra note 11, at 23-26.
Title III provides that Native American prisoners who practice a Native American religion
shall have access comparable to the access afforded prisoners who practice Judeo-Christian
religions to their Native American traditional religious leaders, to items and materials used
in religious ceremonies, and to Native American religious facilities. DIscussIoN DRAFT, supra
note 11, at 26-27. In addition, title III instructs the Attorney General to establish a Commis-
sion to investigate the conditions of Native American prisoners in federal and state prisons
with respect to the free exercise of Native American religions. DIscussioN DRAFT, supra note
11, at 28-30. Finally, title IV establishes a commission to reform the existing governmental
procedures used to disburse eagle parts to Native American religious practitioners and eval-
uate the need for the existing procedures to include other birds, animals, or plants held
sacred by traditionally religious Native Americans. DiscussioN DRAFT, supra note 11, at 30-
34.
19. See Improvement of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: Hearings on S.
2250 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [here-
inafter Hearings S. 2250]; American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1989:
Hearings on S. 1124 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Hearings S. 1124]; 135 CONG. REC. S16,799-800 (daily ed. Nov. 21,
1989); 137 CONG. REc. S763 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991).
20. As of March 30, 1992, over 60 tribal groups have passed resolutions in favor of the
proposed amendment. (Resolutions on file at the Native American Rights Fund). Indeed, at
a recent Oversight Hearing before the United States Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs, many tribal and religious leaders testified in support of the proposed amendment.
Oversight Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs on the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act (1992) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing]. See Tribes' Religious
Freedom: Congressional Hearing in Portland Should Advance American Indians' Quest for
Religious Equality, OREGONIAN, Mar. 2, 1992; Indians Launch Drive for Religious Rights:
At a Portland Hearing, a Senate Panel Listens to Calls for Guaranteed Freedom of Wor-
ship, OREGONIAN, Mar. 8, 1992.
21. The American Civil Liberties Union, national environmental groups, and national
4
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draw criticism from groups representing timber, mining, archaeo-
logical, and ranching interests that portray past attempts to amend
the AIRFA as unconstitutional establishments of religion. 2
To determine whether the proposed 1993 amendment consti-
tutes an establishment of religion, the amendment must be judged
either by the test set out in the 1991 Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision of Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh2 3
or the standard enunciated in the 1971 Supreme Court decision of
Lemon v. Kurtzman." ' In Peyote Way, the court upheld an exemp-
tion to federal drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote by
members of the Native American Church, holding that even
though the federal government singled out a particular religion for
protection, the exemption did not violate the establishment clause
since it was rationally related to the federal government's unique
trust responsibility to preserve and protect Native American com-
munities.25 In Lemon, the Court first set out the generally accepted
three-part establishment clause test, holding that in order to pass
establishment clause scrutiny, a governmental action must have a
secular purpose, not have a primary effect that either advances or
inhibits religion, and not foster excessive governmental entangle-
ment with religion. 6
This article examines the federal government's unique rela-
tionship with Indian tribes, the Lyng, Smith, and O'Lone deci-
sions, the proposed AIRFA amendment, and the Peyote Way and
Lemon decisions in order to determine whether the proposed
amendment violates the establishment clause. Part I explores the
religious groups have indicated their approval of the proposed amendment. Many religious
groups are also currently lobbying for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, which
would restore the law as it existed prior to the Smith decision. H.R. REP. No. 2797, 102d
Cong. (1991).
22. See, e.g., Hearings S. 2250, supra note 19, at 114-20 (written testimony of Scott M.
Matheson, attorney, Parsons, Bahle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, Utah, on behalf of American
Mining Congress, Timber Associations of California, Alaska Miners Association, Colorado
Mining Association, Montana Coal Council, Nevada Mining Association, Northwest Mining
Association, Utah Mining Association, and Wyoming Mining Association). Hearings S. 2250,
supra note 19, at 367 (testimony by the Society for American Archaeology). Hearings S.
2250, supra note 19, at 152 (statement by the Public Lands Council, National Cattlemen's
Association and National Wool Growers Association). Similarly, at least three courts have
suggested that governmental protection of Native American religious practices may violate
the establishment clause in cases dealing with Indian sacred sites on public land. Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980); Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F.
Supp. 182, 189 (D. Alaska 1982); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd,
706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
23. 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
24. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1216-17.
26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
1993]
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origins and present nature of the trust relationship between the
United States government and Indian communities, with special
attention to the federal government's treatment of Indian religions.
Part II details the adverse effects of the Supreme Court's recent
free exercise clause jurisprudence in Lyng, Smith, and O'Lone and
explains how these effects would be remedied by the proposed
amendment. Part III explains and defends the Peyote Way estab-
lishment clause standard as a sensible and logical melding of es-
tablishment clause and federal Indian law principles. Part III also
shows that the proposed amendment is clearly constitutional when
judged by the Peyote Way standard. Part IV argues that in addi-
tion to passing the establishment clause test set out in Peyote
Way, the proposed amendment passes the traditional three-part
establishment clause standard articulated in Lemon. Finally, part
V concludes by urging passage of the proposed amendment by
Congress as quickly as possible.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: INDIAN RELIGIONS AND THE TRUST
DOCTRINE
As sovereign nations pre-existing the formation of the United
States, Indian tribes occupy a unique status in the American polit-
ical structure.17 Members of Indian tribes represent the only group
of people in the United States who are separately identified in the
United States Constitution as politically distinct.28 Besides being
27. Prior to White contact, at least six hundred distinct tribal societies existed in
North America. These tribes were sovereign nations with their own distinct languages, econ-
omies, political forms, religions and cultures. JOHN COLLIER, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS 102
(1947); HAROLD E. DRIVER, INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 287-308 (2d rev. ed. 1969); COHEN,
supra note 11, at 229.
28. Since the framers of the United States Constitution regarded Indian tribes as sov-
ereign nations, no general power over Indian affairs exists in the Constitution. Nell J.
Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195, 200 (1984). Indians, however, are expressly mentioned three times in the Constitu-
tion. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Indian commerce clause" granting the federal government
the exclusive power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
3 (excluding "Indians not taxed" from apportionment for purposes of representation and
direct taxation); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (apportioning representatives "excluding Indi-
ans not taxed"). Additionally, Indians are implicitly mentioned two times in the Constitu-
tion. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("treaty clause" granting the federal government authority
to enter into treaties [with foreign nations and Indian tribes]); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(limiting citizenship to persons "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States [excluding
tribal Indians]).
Courts have generally held that the principal foundations for federal power over Indian
affairs are the Indian commerce clause and the treaty clause. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ari-
zona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) ("The source of federal authority over
Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized
that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian
[Vol. 54
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uniquely cast in the Constitution, Indian tribes derive their special
political and legal status from their pre-contact aboriginal rights"9
and their treaty relationships with the United States government. °
In addition, Indian tribes are unique political entities because of
the federal government's assumption of a fiduciary responsibility
to ensure their continued existence.
This trust relationship between Indian tribes and the federal
government was first articulated in two Supreme Court decisions
in the early 1830s. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,s1 the Cherokee
Indian Tribe attempted to enjoin the enforcement of Georgia stat-
tribes and for treaty making.").
29. Chief Justice John Marshall laid the foundations of federal Indian law in 1823 by
holding that the United States gained title to Indian lands by virtue of "discovery." Johnson
v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 567 (1823). Further, Marshall held that this title was
subject to the original inhabitants' "aboriginal title," a right of occupancy which may only
be extinguished by purchase or conquest by the United States. Id.
The racist assumptions underlying Justice Marshall's Johnson opinion were most
clearly stated by Marshall's close friend and fellow justice, Joseph Story, who wrote:
The title of the Indians was not treated as a right of propriety and dominion, but
as a mere right of occupancy. As infidels, heathens, and savages, they were not
allowed to possess the prerogatives belonging to absolute, sovereign, and indepen-
dent nations. The territory over which they wandered, and which they used for
their temporary and fugitive purposes, was, in respect to Christians, deemed as if
it were inhabited only by brute animals.
JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTARIES § 152, reprinted in THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF
BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (Mark F. Lindley ed., 1926).
Johnson was modified in 1955, when the Supreme Court held that aboriginal title may
be extinguished by the federal government without compensation since it is not a form of
property protected by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1955). The Fifth
Amendment provides, in part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. However, aboriginal title (as well as aboriginal
hunting, fishing, gathering, and water rights) may only be extinguished by explicit federal
treaties, statutes or executive orders. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577
(1908) (water rights necessary for survival reserved for Tribe by federal government unless
explicitly extinguished); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 383 (1905) (fishing rights).
30. Until the passage of 25 U.S.C. § 71 in 1871, which abolished the practice of making
treaties with Indian tribes, the United States purchased large amounts of Indian lands by
entering into over 650 treaties pursuant to the treaty clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. In most treaties, tribes relinquished land in exchange for promises that the United
States would create a reservation for the tribe. See INSTITUTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INDIAN LAW, A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS MADE BY INDIAN TRIBES
WITH THE UNITED STATES (1973) (listing of all treaties and agreements entered into with the
Indian tribes); 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904) (collec-
tion of texts of treaties).
Like aboriginal rights, treaties with Indian tribes may be abrogated by federal laws, if
done expressly by Congress. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). Unlike aboriginal rights, however, Indian treaty
rights are a form of property protected by the Fifth Amendment. Shoshone Tribe of Indians
v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937). Thus, when treaties are abrogated by Congress,
tribes are entitled to just compensation. Id.
31. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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utes on lands secured to the Cherokees by federal treaties. Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall held that the Tribe
could not invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
since the Tribe was not a "foreign state" within the meaning of
that term in article III of the United States Constitution.32 In-
stead, Marshall characterized Indian tribes as "domestic depen-
dent nations" whose "relation to the United States resembles that
of a ward to his guardian. 33
One year later, in Worcester v. Georgia,3 4 two non-Indian mis-
sionaries residing on Cherokee lands appealed from their convic-
tion in Georgia state courts for violating some of the statutes chal-
lenged in Cherokee Nation. In Worcester, the Marshall Court held
that the state statutes were unlawful under the supremacy clause
and construed the federal treaties and the Indian Trade and Inter-
course Acts as protecting the Indians' status as distinct political
communities "having territorial boundaries, within which their au-
thority [of self-government] is exclusive. a3  Thus, when taken to-
gether, the two "Cherokee cases" established that the federal gov-
ernment has a trust obligation to ensure the continued existence of
semi-sovereign Indian tribes.
It was more than five decades after the Cherokee cases before
the Supreme Court again addressed the scope of this trust obliga-
tion a.3  In the late 1800s and early 1900s, courts read the trust obli-
32. Id. at 19-20.
33. Id. at 17.
34. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
35. Id. at 557.
36. Immediately following the Cherokee cases, Indian tribes did not seek judicial re-
view of actions by federal officials which deprived them of their ancestral homelands. For
instance, Indian tribes did not challenge the administration of the Indian Removal Act of
1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830), which forced the removal of most of the eastern and south-
ern tribes to the trans-Mississippi region. See JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION (1988) (describing the painful journey of sixteen thousand
Cherokees from their ancestral homes in Georgia to what is now eastern Oklahoma).
Later, many Indian tribes located west of the Mississippi River were removed to reser-
vations a fraction of the size of their territories by the federal government, due in part to
Whites' desire for good farmland, valuable mineral deposits, and overland travel routes. See
COHEN, supra note 11, at 124; DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970).
Again, Indian tribes did not immediately challenge the removals which were often fraudu-
lent and violative of treaty and aboriginal rights. For example, in 1877 the federal govern-
ment unilaterally changed the terms of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty in order to gain con-
trol of the Black Hills of present-day South Dakota, where gold had been discovered. The
Treaty guaranteed the Lakota and Dakota nations "absolute and undisturbed use of the
Great Sioux Reservation," which included all of what is now South Dakota, and parts of
Nebraska, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana. After initially filing a petition in the
Court of Claims in 1923, the Sioux Nation finally was awarded over seventeen million dol-
lars as just compensation for the Fifth Amendment "taking" by the Court of Claims in 1974.
Sioux Nation v. United States, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm'n 151 (1974). Although this decision was
[Vol. 54
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gation set out in the Cherokee cases to allow Congress virtually
unlimited or plenary power to legislate on behalf of Indian tribes. 7
During this time, courts applying this "plenary power doctrine"
did not closely scrutinize federal policies designed to assimilate tri-
bal Indians into mainstream American society. Consequently, the
implementation of these policies did great damage to Native Amer-
ican tribes.
Perhaps the most harmful federal assimilationist policy was
the allotment of Indian tribal lands by the federal government in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.38 Pursuant to the General
Allotment Act of 1887 59-the centerpiece of the federal govern-
ment's allotment policy-many tribal members were allotted 160
acres of tribal land and considerable amounts of "surplus" land
were surrendered to the government for the public domain or for
disposition to homesteaders. The government, however, grossly un-
derfunded the allotment program, leaving many impoverished In-
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S.
371, 388 (1980), many of the Sioux bands have refused to accept the compensation, asking
instead for the return of the Black Hills, which they consider to be sacred land. Oglala Sioux
Tribe v. United States, 650 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) (tribe
unsuccessfully sought restoration of Black Hills; suit barred by res judicata). In 1985, the
"Sioux Nation Black Hills Act" was introduced in the United States Senate by Senator
William Bradley of New Jersey. The bill would re-establish a portion of the Great Sioux
Reservation using federally-held lands in the Black Hills area. S. 705, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985). See Richard Pemberton, Jr., "I Saw That It Was Holy": The Black Hills and the
Concept of Sacred Land, 3 LAW AND INEQ. J. 287, 300-11 n.94; EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK
HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE (1991).
37. For example, in 1903, a statute which allotted Indian tribal land and authorized
the sale of unalloted "surplus" lands was upheld against a constitutional challenge by an
Indian tribe in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). In Lone Wolf, the Court de-
ferred to the plenary or unlimited power of the Congress to administer tribal property on
behalf of Indian tribes. The Court "presumed" that the government "would be governed by
such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an
ignorant and dependent race." Id. at 565.
38. Another harmful federal policy was the Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat.
362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970)), a federal statute which
gave the federal government criminal jurisdiction to try and punish murder and other seri-
ous crimes in Indian Country. Although the act represented a significant interference with
tribal self-government, the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama upheld it, declaring
that "[t]hese Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on
the United States .... From their very weakness and helplessness ... there arises the duty
of protection, and with it the power." 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
Additionally, federal policies which allowed the slaughter of millions of buffalo in the
1860s, 1870s, and 1880s by sportsmen and commercial hunters had an adverse effect on the
Plains Indians, whose entire political, economic, and spiritual way of life was centered on
the previously vast herds. R. UTLEY, THE LAST DAYS OF THE Sioux NATION 229-30 (1963)
("For the Plains Indians, the disappearance of the buffalo was a shattering cultural
catastrophe.").
39. Ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current version codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (1982)).
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dians with no choice but to sell their land to non-Indian inter-
ests.40 Thus, although allotment of communally owned Indian
lands was designed to turn Indians into self-sufficient farmers,"1 it
actually reduced the amount of Indian farming.42 Indeed, allot-
ment was only a success for those who had hoped that it would
open up sparsely occupied reservation lands to white settlement
and railroad, and mining and timber operations43 since allotment
resulted in the transfer of over three-fourths of the previous Indian
land base to white settlers and corporations.44
In addition to fragmenting many-tribes' communally owned
land base, the replacement of traditional Indian religions with
Christianity was an integral part of the federal government's
overtly assimilative policies of the late 1800s and early 1900s.
41
Since Christianity was equated with civilization and Indian reli-
gions were regarded as primitive and immoral, government agents
were steadfast in their promotion of Christian sects and their sup-
pression of Indian dances, rituals, and other traditional cultural
and religious practices.4" For many years, the federal government
40. The federal government appropriated less than ten dollars per allotment for seeds
and equipment. History of the Allotment Policy, Hearings on H.R. 7902 before the House
Committee on Indian Affairs. 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, 428-29 (1934) (testimony of D.S.
Otis).
41. See generally AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIAN: WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF
THE INDIAN," 1880-1900 (Francis P. Prucha, ed., 1974).
42. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 305 (abridged ed. 1986).
43. John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The Movement to Assimilate the American Indians: A
Jurisprudential Study, 57 UMKC L. REv. 399, 406-07 (1989) ("The unshakable greed for
Indian lands, which had dominated most of the United States' Indian policy throughout the
nineteenth century, was clearly present in the late 1800s when the assimilation movement
began in earnest.").
44. As a result of the allotment policy, Indian landholdings were reduced from 138
million acres in 1887 to 48 million in 1934. Of this 48 million acres, nearly 20 million were
desert or semiarid and virtually useless for any kind of annual farming ventures. Memoran-
dum, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73 Cong., 2d
Sess. 16 (1934) (J. Collier Memorandum).
45. In President Grant's 1869 Peace Policy, he asked all Christian missionary societies
for nominations of persons to be civilian Indian agents and created a presidential advisory
board of religious leaders to give advice on Indian policy. The commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs remarked that:
[T]he President wisely determined to invoke the cooperation of the entire reli-
gious element of the country, to help by their labors and counsels, to bring about
and produce the expenditure of the munificent annual appropriation of money by
Congress, for the civilization and Christianization of the Indian race.
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for
the Year 1870 10 (Washington, D.C. 1870).
46. In 1883 the commissioner of Indian Affairs prohibited the sun dance, the scalp
dance, and the war dance, stating that:
[Tihere is no good reason why an Indian should be permitted to indulge in prac-
tices which are alike repugnant to the common decency and morality; and the
10
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actively sponsored Christian missionary groups on Indian reserva-
tions, 47 actually dividing up reservations between denominations.48
For a time, the government even outlawed traditional Indian reli-
gious ceremonies. "9 For instance, in 1921, the Office of Indian Af-
fairs released an official circular which advised that "[tihe sun-
dance, and all other similar dances and so-called religious ceremo-
nies are considered 'Indian Offenses' under existing regulations,
and corrective penalties are provided." 50 Additionally, in an effort
to destroy Indian culture, the federal government took Indian chil-
dren from their parents and sent them far away to boarding
schools for as long as eight years, during which time they were not
permitted to see their parents, relatives, or friends.51 The boarding
schools, often run by religious denominations, forbade young In-
dian children to speak their native languages, practice their native
religions, or dress or wear their hair in traditional ways.2 The goal
of the educators was, in the words of Richard Pratt, the founder
and head of the Carlisle School for Indians in Pennsylvania, to
"kill the Indian in him, and save the man."5
Federal assimilationist policies such as the allotment of tribal
land, criminalization of traditional Indian religious practices, pro-
preservation of good order on the reservations demands that some active measures
should be taken to discourage and, if possible, put a stop to the demoralizing in-
fluence of heathenish rites.
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for
the Year 1883 XIV-XV (Washington, D.C. 1883).
47. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 280 (1922) (acts issuing patents for Indian Lands to religious
societies); 35 Stat. 814 (1909); 25 U.S.C. § 280(a) (1990); 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1887); 23 Stat. 26
(1884); LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, The Office of Indian Affairs, Its History, Activities and
Organization, Prepared for the Institute for Government Research 40 (Baltimore 1927) (be-
tween 1819 and 1842, the federal government made appropriations of $214,500 to missionary
societies for the education of American Indians); Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1894 (Washington 1895) (re-
porting that missions customarily used stone or timber from the reservations in erecting
their buildings).
48. Jill E. Martin, Constitutional Rights and Indian Rites: An Uneasy Balance, 3:2
WESTERN LEGAL HISTORY 245, 249 (1990) ("Competition between the different denomina-
tions became fierce at times, until the government resolved the problem by assigning agen-
cies to each denomination. Each was allowed to establish its religion at its agencies, without
competition from other sects, by setting up churches and schools.").
49. See, e.g., Ann. Rep., supra note 42, at XV; Bureau of Indian Affairs Regulations
for Indian Courts (1892).
50. Office of Indian Affairs, Circular No. 1665 (1921).
51. PETER FARB, MAN'S RISE TO CIVILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE INDIANS OF NORTH
AMERICA FROM PRIMEVAL TIMES TO THE COMING OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE 257 (1968).
52. ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., Now THAT THE BUFFALO'S GONE 85 (1984); T.C. McLUHAN.
TOUCH THE EARTH 103-04 (1971).
53. Richard Pratt, The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites, in AMERICANIZ-
ING THE AMERICAN INDIANS 261 (Francis P. Prucha ed., 1973).
1993]
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motion of Christian missions in Indian Country, and separation of
young Indian children from their parents and traditional culture
through the boarding school system continued unabated until
1934, when Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act.54 Also
in the 1930s, the Supreme Court began to reduce the expansive
discretion previously conferred upon Congress by the plenary
power doctrine.55 Because of this new governmental attitude, some
of the damage done to Indian tribes by the previous era of assimi-
lative policies was beginning to be repaired.
In the 1950s, however, federal Indian policy changed once
again. The federal government began to "terminate" many Indian
tribes, stripping them of their unique relationship with the federal
government and ending benefits based on federal statutes, treaties,
and aboriginal rights.56 The proponents of this policy believed that
cutting Indian tribes loose from the federal government would al-
low them to prosper.5 7 Instead, termination often harmed Indian
tribes and hindered their ability to maintain their separate cultural
status.5 8 For example, the termination of the Menominee Tribe
54. Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982)).
The Act prohibited further individual allotment of Indian lands, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1982);
returned lands withdrawn for homesteads to tribal use, Id. at § 463; authorized annual ap-
propriations of funds for land purposes, Id. at § 465; made mandatory conservation of tribal
lands, Id. at § 466; established a revolving credit fund for the benefit of individual Native
Americans and tribes, Id. at § 470; encouraged tribal self-government and self-management
of economic resources, Id. at § 469; provided funds for educational loans, Id. at § 471; and
gave Native Americans a preference under Civil Service rules for employment in the Indian
Service, Id. at § 472(a).
Also in the 1930s, Congress established a National Monument at Pipestone, Minnesota,
in order to preserve a sacred site for Indian religious use. 16 U.S.C. § 445(c) (1937).
55. In United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935), and Seminole Nation
v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942), the Court held that the United States govern-
ment was to be held accountable to Indian tribes regarding tribal property because of the
fiduciary relationship described earlier in the Cherokee Nation cases.
56. See, e.g., H. Con. Res. 108 (67 Stat. B132) (1953) (It was the "sense of Congress
that, at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and the individual members
thereof located within the States of California, Florida, New York and Texas .... should be
freed from Federal supervision and control and all disabilities and limitations specifically
applicable to Indians."); Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588, (1953) (permitting state governments to
assume both civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations in the states of Califor-
nia, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, and the then-territory of Alaska); 25 U.S.C.
§§ 741-60 (1976) (Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah forced to distribute its assets to tribal mem-
bers and then to disband).
57. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 18
(1983).
58. During the termination period, large amounts of Indian land passed into non-In-
dian hands, tribal economic development was generally ignored, and Indians were en-
couraged to relocate in large cities off their reservations. See DONALD L. Fixico, TERMINA-
TION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 1945-1960 (1986); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra
note 57, at 20 ("The impact of termination upon those tribes affected was unmistakable and
12
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transformed -their moderately prosperous reservation into the
poorest county in Wisconsin."9
The 1960s marked the beginning of the federal government's
current policy of recognizing Indian tribes as semi-sovereign politi-
cal entities. Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court subjected
congressional actions to meaningful scrutiny ° and used the trust
doctrine to protect rights secured through treaties, statutes, and
agreements."1 Courts also strengthened the trust doctrine as an in-
dependent cause of action for Indian tribes against executive agen-
cies of the United States government.2 Also during this period, the
federal government ended its harmful termination policies 3 and,
pursuant to its trust responsibility to Indian tribes," passed legis-
significant. If the policy did not completely destroy Indian culture, it encroached substan-
tially upon Indian attempts to remain Indian.").
59. The Menominee tribe's status was restored by the Menominee Restoration Act of
1974. See N. Peroff, Menominee Drums: Tribal Termination and Restoration, 1954-1974
(1982); Joseph F. Preloznik and Steven Felsenthal, The Menominee Struggle to Maintain
Their Tribal Assets and Protect Their Treaty Rights Following Termination, 51 N.D. L.
REV. 53 (1974).
60. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (limiting holding in
Lone Wolf by requiring explicit proof of congressional intent to terminate or modify a
treaty). See also United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 414-15 (1980) (removing the
presumption of good faith that Lone Wolf attached to congressional actions and holding
that the political question doctrine, long a bar to tribal challenges to federal actions, was
inapplicable to congressional relations with Native Americans); Delaware Tribal Business
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977) (rejecting the notion that federal legislation con-
cerning Indians is immune from judicial scrutiny).
61. For instance, in Menominee Tribe, the Supreme Court construed the Wolf Creek
Treaty broadly, reasoning that the treaty secured the Menominee "their way of life" and
that their way of life included the right to hunt and fish. See also United States v. White,
508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974) (because right to use hunted eagles in religious rituals is an
integral part of cative life, this right is implicit in treaty).
62. For example, in 1973, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia in
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D. D.C. 1973), used the trust
doctrine to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from further lowering the water level in a
lake essential to the well-being of an Indian tribe. See Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364
F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (United States has duty to disclose discovery of valuable gas on
leased Indian land). See generally Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1230-34 (1975).
63. In a letter to Congress dated July 8, 1970, President Nixon formally abandoned
the federal policy of termination of Indian tribes, declaring that the policy was "morally and
legally unacceptable, because it produces bad practical results, and because the mere threat
of termination tends to discourage greater self sufficiency among Indian groups." 116 CONG.
REc. 23,132 (1970).
64. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974), the Supreme Court explicitly
identified the trust responsibility as a source of federal power to legislate on behalf of In-
dian tribes which is implicit in either the Constitution itself or in treaties with Indian tribes.
This concept was first articulated in the Cherokee cases and later refined in United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). This refinement has been described by one commentator as
"recast[ing] the Marshallian guardianship, treating it as a source of federal power in addi-
tion to and apart from the express power in the Constitution to regulate Commerce with the
13
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lation which strengthened tribal governments and attempted to re-
dress the continuing problems associated with chronic poverty on
Indian reservations." For instance, Indian tribes benefitted from
the "War on Poverty" of the 1960s,16 the Indian Self-Determina-
tion and Education Assistance Act of 1975,67 and the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978.8
The trust responsibility has also justified many recent laws
and regulations designed to protect traditional Indian religions
from widespread governmental insensitivity and thus reverse the
adverse effects of prior federal policies. For example, federal legis-
lation returned two sacred sites to Indian tribes,6 9 granted Indian
access and restricted non-Indian access to several Indian sacred
sites,7" exempted eagles taken for Indian religious purposes from
Indian tribes." CHAMBERS, supra note 62, at 1223.
65. See COHEN, supra note 11, at 180-206.
66. During the "War on Poverty" Congress provided additional funding to existing
programs specially designed for Indians. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 175 (1988) (legal services); 25
U.S.C. §§ 271-304 (1988) (education); 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-54 (1988) (education, medical atten-
tion, and social welfare).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 450a to n (1976). This Act permits the Secretary of the Interior to
transfer management of certain Bureau of Indian Affairs programs to the tribes. Regulations
under the Act specifically permit transfer of authority over land use planning, forest man-
agement, timber sales, range management, agricultural leasing, and maintenance of land use
records. 25 C.F.R. §§ 271.31 to .34 (1980). However, the Act explicitly prevents the Secretary
from abrogating trust responsibilities to tribes in matters regarding tribal resources. 25
U.S.C. §§ 450j(f), 450n(2) (1976).
68. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978). In the Act, Congress established mini-
mum standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of
such children in foster or adoptive homes in order to ensure that, whenever possible, the
cultural values of the tribe are not denied the orphaned Indian child.
69. Pub. L. No. 98-408, 98 Stat. 1533 (1984) (return of sacred lands in Arizona to the
Zuni tribe); Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (1970) (return of the Blue Lake area in New
Mexico to the Pueblo de Taos Tribe).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 4305 (1988) (Federal Cave Resources Protection Act requires notifica-
tion to tribes of possible harm to, or destruction of, sites having religious or cultural impor-
tance on Indian land); 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-47 (1987), 16 U.S.C. § 410pp-6 (1988) (non-exclu-
sive access to Indians for religious purposes assured at El Malpais National Monument and
National Conservation Area, and Zuni-Cibola National Historical Park, respectively; lands
may be temporarily closed to public in order to protect privacy of religious activities by
Indian people); 16 U.S.C. § 543f (1984) (access to land by Indian people for traditional cul-
tural and religious purposes shall be insured at National Forest Scenic-Research Areas); 16
U.S.C. § 410ii-4 (1980) (traditional Native American religious use not prohibited at Chaco
Culture National Historical Park); 16 U.S.C. § 470cc (1979) (Archaeological Resources Pro-
tection Act requires notification to tribes of possible harm to, or destruction of, sites having
religious or cultural importance); 16 U.S.C. § 228i(c) (1975) (access to Indian sacred or reli-
gious places on Havasupai Indian Reservation may not be prohibited); 25 U.S.C. § 640d-19
(1974) (guarantees Navaho and Hopi access to Cliff Spring religious shrine located in a dis-
puted area between the Navaho and Hopi Reservations); 92 Stat. 1672, 1679 (1978) (no
explorations, surveys, or excavations shall be authorized within a 200-yard radius of certain
Indian shrines or religious sites on Pueblo of Santa Ana and Pueblo of Zia trust lands).
14
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the Eagle Protection Act under certain circumstances,71 and pro-
vided for the return of certain religiously or culturally significant
Indian burial remains and funerary objects held in museums.72 In-
deed, in 1978, Congress pledged "to protect and preserve for Amer-
ican Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express,
and exercise [their] traditional religions" in the AIRFA. 7s In addi-
tion, federal administrative regulations exempted the sacramental
use of peyote from federal drug laws74 and required agencies to no-
tify Indian tribes of possible harm to sacred sites on public land.7 5
II. THE NEED FOR PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION: THE ADVERSE
EFFECTS OF LYNG, SMITH, AND O'LONE
Although these recent laws and regulations protecting Native
American religions have helped to counteract the effects of previ-
ous governmental policies, they have generally not provided ade-
quate legal protections7 for Native American religions burdened
by insensitive government officials.77 In the past, because of this
lack of statutory protection, many Native Americans asserted their
constitutional rights under the First Amendment's free exercise
clause to eliminate governmental burdens on their traditional reli-
gions. Although Native Americans were not always successful
under established First Amendment doctrine, state actors hinder-
ing religious practices were often required to prove that their ac-
71. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1962).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (1990) (Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act); 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9(a) (1989) (National Museum of the American Indian Act).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978).
74. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1990) (first promulgated in 31 Fed. Reg. 4679 (1966)).
75. 18 C.F.R. § 1312.7 (1984) (Tennessee Valley Authority); 32 C.F.R. §§ 229.7 (1984),
763.5 (1987) (Department of Defense); 36 C.F.R. § 296.7 (1984) (Forest Service); 43 C.F.R. §
7.7 (1984) (Public Lands, Interior Department); 47 C.F.R. § 1.1307 (1990) (Federal Commu-
nications Commission).
76. Federal statutes have not provided Native Americans adequate legal remedies for
governmental interference with their traditional religions. For instance, the AIRFA, al-
though a fine exposition of laudable policy objectives, has been held to not provide a viable
cause of action in sacred site cases. Federal courts have generally held that the AIRFA
merely requires federal agencies to "consider" the religious rights of Indians before develop-
ing federal land. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F.
Supp. 785, 794 (D. S.D. 1982).
77. Although great strides have been made in government/Indian relations, conflict
between sometimes ethnocentric governmental officials and traditional Native American
practitioners is still quite common. These conflicts were documented in a task force report
prepared pursuant to section two of AIRFA which evaluated AIRFA's policies and proce-
dures in consultation with native traditional religious leaders. According to the report, there
were 522 separate instances where federal agencies violated Indian religious practices in
1978 and 1979. AIRFA REPORT, supra note 12.
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tions were justified by a compelling interest."'
The Supreme Court, by eliminating the compelling interest
test in its Lyng, Smith, and O'Lone decisions, has adversely af-
fected Native American worship at sacred sites, the sacramental
use of peyote by members of the Native American Church, the reli-
gious use of eagle parts and feathers by Native Americans, and the
religious rights of Native American prisoners. The following
paragraphs discuss how the Lyng, Smith, and O'Lone decisions af-
fected these religious practices and how the 1993 proposed amend-
ment would remedy these adverse effects.
A. Sacred Sites
Native Americans often practice site-specific religions, attach-
ing religious significance to particular natural sites such as high
mountain peaks or secluded valleys." Because Native Americans
define themselves in terms of a common heritage enriched by past,
present, and future ceremonies at sacred sites, the integrity of
these sites is integral to tribal well-being.80
Despite pressures from the federal government to abandon
their traditional religions," Native Americans have continued to
worship at their often remote and isolated sacred sites. However,
developments interfering with Native American sacred sites lo-
cated on public lands2 have made it difficult for many traditionally
religious Indians to conduct their ceremonies and rituals.
When government developments have threatened sacred sites
on public land, Native Americans have often sought constitutional
protection from the First Amendment's free exercise clause since
federal statutes have not afforded adequate protection.8 3 Gener-
78. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
79. For example, the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indian tribes worship in the "high
country" of northwestern California and the Wintu, Pit River, Modoc, and Karok Indian
tribes worship at Panther Meadows, near Mt. Shasta, California. The "high country" was
threatened in the Lyng case by a logging road and timber harvesting. See infra notes 91-93
and accompanying text. Panther Meadows is currently threatened by a proposed ski resort.
See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
80. One commentator has noted that "[tihe ceremonies that belong to these sacred
sites involve a process of continuous revelation and provide the people with the necessary
information to enable them to maintain a balance in their relationships with the earth and
other forms of life." Vine Deloria, Jr., Sacred Lands and Religious Freedom, NATIVE AM.
RIGHTS FUND LEGAL REV. 1, 5 (1991).
81. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
82. Native American sacred sites are often located on public land, because Indian res-
ervations were often created without regard to the locations of sacred sites. See AIRFA
REPORT, supra note 12, at 51; Russell L. Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedom for Indig-
enous Americans, 65 OR. L. REV. 363, 396 (1986).
83. See supra note 76.
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ally, courts have not been receptive to their claims. For instance, in
some cases, courts avoided the compelling interest test by holding
either that the Indian religion would not be "burdened ' 84 or that
the sacred sites were not "central or indispensable" to Indian reli-
gion." Even if Native Americans could convince courts that their
religions were burdened and their sacred sites were central or in-
dispensable to their religions, courts often held that certain gov-
ernment interests, such as the maintenance of a certain water level
for a hydroelectric dam8" or off-shore oil drilling in a particular
area,8 7 were compelling. In other cases, courts held that since the
Native American plaintiffs did not have a property interest in their
sacred sites, their claims were without merit.8
In 1986, however, Native Americans won their first major vic-
tory in their long quest to protect their sacred sites located on
public land by invoking the free exercise clause in the landmark
decision of Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peter-
son.89 In Peterson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals prevented
timber harvesting and the construction of a logging road which
would have burdened Native American worship at a sacred site
since the actions did not represent a compelling interest.90
The gains made in Peterson were short lived as the Supreme
Court reversed Peterson in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n 9l in 1988. Writing for a five justice majority, Jus-
tice O'Connor held that even though the construction of the log-
ging road and the harvesting of timber would "virtually destroy...
the Indians' ability to practice their religion," the construction did
not burden the Native Americans' religion because it did not pun-
ish Native Americans for practicing their religion or coerce them
84. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 742, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (construction of a ski
slope on a sacred mountain did not burden Indians' religious freedom); Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988) (construction of logging road
near sacred peak did not excessively burden Indians' religion).
85. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980).
86. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
87. Inupiat Co. of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska
1982).
88. Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 791 (D. S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.
1983); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 I.L.R. 3073, 3076 (D. D.C. 1981), afJ'd sub nom. Wilson
v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp.
608, 612 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
89. 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
90. Id. at 596.
91. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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into violating their individual religious beliefs. 2 In his dissent, Jus-
tice Brennan warned that the Court's decision would "strip[ ] re-
spondents and all other Native Americans of any constitutional
protection against perhaps the most serious threat to their age-old
religious practices, and indeed to their entire way of life. '" Two
years after Lyng, in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith,"
the Court further diminished the protective scope of the free exer-
cise clause. In Smith, Justice Scalia, writing for a five-justice ma-
jority, held that the State of Oregon's prohibition of the sacramen-
tal use of peyote-the central practice of the Native American
Church-did not violate the free exercise clause because the com-
pelling interest test could only be applied when the government
acts specifically in order to punish a particular religion. 5
Today, government actions threaten to destroy many Native
American sacred sites. For example, Mt. Shasta in California,9" Mt.
Graham in Arizona,97 the Badger-Two Medicine area in Montana,98
92. Id. at 452-53.
93. Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Many commentators have also criticized this
decision. See, e.g., Donald Falk, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n: Bull-
dozing First Amendment Protection of Indian Sacred Lands, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515 (1989);
Peggy Healy, Note, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n: A Form-Over-
Effect Standard for the free exercise clause, 20 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 171 (1988); John Rhodes,
An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native Americans, 52 MONT. L. REV.
13, 45-64 (1991); J. Brett Pritchard, Note, Conduct and Belief in the Free Exercise Clause:
Developments and Deviations in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 76
CORNELL L. REV. 268 (1990).
94. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
95. Id. at 886 n.3. Commentators have similarly criticized the Court's opinion in
Smith. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Peyote and Judicial Political Activism: Neo-Colonial-
ism and the Supreme Court's New Indian Law Agenda, 38:2 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 92 (1991);
John Rhodes, supra note 93; Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Ore-
gon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV 1 (1991); Tom C. Rawlings, Comment, Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith: The Supreme Court Deserts the Free Exercise
Clause, 25 GA. L. REV. 567 (1991); Chris Day, Note, Employment Div. v. Smith: Free Exer-
cise Clause Loses Balance on Peyote, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 577 (1991); Kenneth Marin, Note,
Employment Div. v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise Doctrine,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431 (1991); Sandra Ashton Pochop, Note, Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith: Religious Peyotism and the "Purposeful" Erosion of
Free Exercise Protections, 36 S.D. L. REV. 358 (1991).
96. At Mt. Shasta, the United States Forest Service is currently planning a timber sale
and the construction of a ski lift which would destroy the religious value of-Panther Mead-
ows, a sacred site used by the Wintu, Pit River, Modoc and Karuk tribes. See Michael
McCabe, Shasta Battle Pits Skiers vs Indians, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 25, 1991, at Al.
97. The Forest Service, the University of Arizona, and the Vatican are currently pro-
posing to build an $80 million complex of three observatory telescopes and support facilities
called the "Columbus project" on Mt. Graham. This development would desecrate and
block access to sacred sites currently used by the San Carlos Apaches. See Marla Donato,
Come One, Come All to Telescope Feud, CH. TRI., Jan. 11, 1992, at 1; Pacheco says UA
Won't Give in to Demands to Kill Scopes Project, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Oct. 16, 1991; Heav-
enly Plan Pits A Graceful Squirrel Against Holy See: Vatican, Others Seek to Build Obser-
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and the Big Horn Medicine Wheel in Wyoming"9 are all threatened
by governmental developments. According to the Lyng decision, -
the Native American religions that hold these sites sacred are not
burdened since none of the developments punish Native Ameri-
cans for practicing their religions or coerce Native Americans into
violating their religious beliefs. According to the Smith decision,
even assuming that the religions are burdened, none of these devel-
opers need prove a compelling interest since they do not intend to
punish Native Americans for practicing their religions. Thus, the
Lyng and Smith decisions give government officials virtually un-
limited power to destroy sacred sites essential to the continued ex-
istence of Native American tribes.
The proposed AIRFA amendment recognizes that the destruc-
tion of ancient Native American holy places, strikes at the very
heart of traditional Native American communities. The proposed
AIRFA amendment would protect these essential holy places by
requiring that "whenever a governmental action is posing or will
pose a substantial and realistic threat of undermining or frustrat-
ing a Native American religion," the governmental agency must
demonstrate a compelling interest.100 Therefore, the proposed
amendment would in effect reinstate the Peterson standard which
required governmental actors to show a compelling interest if their
actions burden the free exercise of religion. As a result, it will ulti-
mately provide meaningful protection for sacred sites which have
long been an integral part of many Native American religions.
B. The Sacramental Use of Peyote
Peyote is a small, spineless cactus with mild psychedelic
vatory on U.S. Peak Where the Animals Live, WALL ST. J., March 1, 1990, at Al; Oversight
Hearing, supra note 20 (testimony of Ola Cassadore Davis, Apache Survival Coalition).
98. The United States Forest Service plans to allow oil and gas development, in the
Badger Two-Medicine area held sacred by the Blackfeet Tribe. See Don Baum, U.S. Ap-
proves Drilling on Sacred Indian Wild Land: The Blackfeet Tribe and Conservationists
Oppose the Exploratory Montana Oil and Gas Well, An Appeal is Planned, L.A. TIMES,
March 2, 1991, at A28; Don Baum, Blackfeet Battle U.S. Oil Plan, NEWSDAY, Nov. 18, 1990,
at 17; Jim Robbins, Fighting Over the Oil on Hallowed Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1986, §
4, at 12.
99. The Forest Service is planning timber and tourism development which would
damage the Big Horn Medicine Wheel, a sacred site of the Northern Plains tribes from the
surrounding four state area. See John G. Watts, Sacred Circle, NATIVE PEOPLES, Summer
1991, at 34; Geoffrey O'Gara, Sacred Site or Tourist Attraction? Indians, Agency Spar Over
Medicine Wheel, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 6, 1989, at A6.
100. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 11, at 18-19. This section also requires that admin-
istrators give notice to and consult with appropriate Indian tribes and traditional leaders
before a federal or federally-assisted undertaking affecting a sacred site may continue. Id. at
12-18.
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properties that grows in northern Mexico and southern Texas.101 It
has been estimated that the indigenous peoples of North America
have used peyote in religious ceremonies since ten thousand years
before the "discovery" of America by Christopher Columbus.0 2
Today, the sacramental use of peyote is the central practice of
the Native American Church, a religious denomination comprised
of approximately 250,000 Native Americans. 10 3 The Church was of-
ficially incorporated in 1918 and has fought a continuing series of
legal battles with government officials bent on imprisoning its
members for illegal drug use.104 This government interference is
unfortunate since the spiritual and social support provided by the
Native American Church has been very effective in combatting al-
coholism among Native Americans.106 Perhaps most importantly,
the Native American Church has been instrumental in drawing to-
gether Native Americans from different regions and tribes, and
cultivating a sense of pride in Indian culture and history. 06
The criminalization of sacramental peyote use was effectively
ended in many states after the 1964 landmark decision of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in People v. Woody.'0 7 Woody reversed the
criminal convictions of a group of Navajo Indians for the unautho-
rized use of peyote. The court held that the criminal convictions
violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment because
the State of California had no compelling interest to justify
101. OMER C. STEWART. PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 3 (1987).
102. Id. For more information about peyotism, see SILVESTER J. BRITO, THE WAY OF A
PEYOTE ROADMAN (1989); TONY HILLERMAN, PEOPLE OF DARKNESS (1980); E. ANDERSON, PE-
YOTE: THE DIVINE CACTUS (1980); J.S. Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in TEACHINGS FROM THE
AMERICAN EARTH, supra note 12, at 96-104.
103. STEWART, supra note 101 at 3.
104. The government's hostile attitude toward peyote use can be illustrated by a Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs bulletin published in the 1920s which ridiculed the religious signifi-
cance of peyote to Native Americans, insisting that any " 'religious' significance, however, is
hardly to be placed in the same category as a genuine religious faith, as the word religion is
rather improperly used to describe what is simply a custom or habit of a people." Robert
E.L. Newberne, Peyote: An Abridged Compilation from the Files of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, (3d ed. 1925); John Collier Papers, Reel 8, 246 (0271), Yale University Library.
105. See generally Paul Pascarosa and Sanford Futterman, Ethnopsychedelic Ther-
apy for Alcoholics: Observations in the Peyote Ritual of the Native American Church, 8
(No. 3) J. OF PSYCHEDELIC DRUGS 215 (1976) (religious peyote use has been helpful in over-
coming alcoholism); Bernard J. Albaugh and Phillip 0. Anderson, Peyote in the Treatment
of Alcoholism Among American Indians, 131:11 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1247, 1249 (1974) ("the
philosophy, teachings, and format of the [Native American Church] can be of great benefit
to the Indian alcoholic"); STEWART, supra note 101, at 75 (noting frequent observations
across many tribes and periods in history, of correlation between peyote religion and absti-
nence from alcohol).
106. STEWART, supra note 101, at 327 ("[E]xcept for the Indian powwow, [peyotism] is
the most pan-Indian institution in America.").
107. 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
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prohibiting sacramental peyote use.108 In no uncertain terms, the
court found that sacramental use of peyote was a positive force in
the lives of individual Indians since the church forbids the use of
alcohol and promotes a sense of community among its Indian ad-
herents.10 9 Due in part to this finding, the court summarily re-
jected the State's all-too-familiar justification that it had a compel-
ling interest in liberating members of the Native American Church
from their "unenlightenment" and from a tradition that "shackles
the Indians to primitive conditions. '" 1 0
Woody was followed by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v.
Whittingham"' and by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in White-
horn v. State"2 and has motivated statutory exemptions for the
sacramental use of peyote in thirteen states. 13 Additionally, in
1966 the federal Drug Enforcement Agency promulgated an ex-
emption, still in effect today, from federal drug laws for the sacra-
mental use of peyote by members of the Native American
Church." 4 As a result, another twelve states codified this federal
exemption in their criminal laws.'1 5 Other states, however, con-
tinue to prohibit the sacramental use of peyote. In particular, the
Oregon Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court
have refused to create constitutional exemptions for sacramental
peyote use." 6
In 1990, in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith,"7 the
Supreme Court gutted the Woody decision by holding that Ore-
gon's prohibition of the sacramental use of peyote did not violate
108. Id. at 821.
109. Id. at 818 n.3.
110. Id.
111. 504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
112. 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1977).
113. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402(b)(1-3) (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-317(3)
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 37-2732A (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 204.204(8) (West 1987);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4116(c)(8) (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.02(4) (West 1989); NEV. REV.
STAT. §453.541 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(d) (West Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 34-208-14 (1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., Art. 4476-15 § 4.11 (Vernon Supp. 1989);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 161.115 (1989); WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1044 (1988); Oregon H.B. No. 3039
(1991).
114. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1990), first promulgated 31 Fed. Reg. 4679 (1966).
115. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.195 (1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-111(d) (Supp. 1992);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-203 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-(c) (West Supp. 1992); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-88(d) (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-02.4 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-
2.01(c) (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-403(d) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-3(3) (1986);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.84:1(d) (Michie 1982); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.201(d) (Supp. 1992);
W. VA. CODE § 60A-2-201(d) (1989).
116. Oregon v. Soto, 537 P.2d 142 (Or. App. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976);
North Carolina v. Bullard, 148 S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967).
117. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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the free exercise clause. In Smith, the Supreme Court did not re-
quire Oregon to prove a compelling interest for prohibiting the
central practice of the Native American Church since the State did
not intend to punish members of the Native American Church for
practicing their religion.11 However, Justice O'Connor, in her con-
curring opinion in Smith, applied the compelling interest test to
Oregon's actions, finding a compelling interest in the regulation of
peyote use by Oregon citizens.119 In dissent, Justice Blackmun
bemoaned the majority's abandonment of the compelling interest
test and Justice O'Connor's characterization of Oregon's interest in
the "symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition" as com-
pelling. Justice Blackmun noted that the State of Oregon had of-
fered "no evidence that the religious use of peyote has ever harmed
anyone ' 11° and that the sale and use of peyote for non-sacramental
purposes is practically non-existent. 121
As a result of Smith, states that exempted the sacramental use
of peyote from their criminal laws because of Woody's holding that
such exemptions were constitutionally required are free to once
again punish the use of peyote as a serious criminal offense. In
Oklahoma and California, where only a judicial exemption was in
place, law enforcement officials may now arrest, convict, and im-
prison Native Americans for the possession or use of the peyote
sacrament under the authority of Smith. Indeed, in Oklahoma, an
elderly, life-long member of the Native American Church currently
faces a felony prosecution for possession of the peyote
sacrament."'
That United States citizens should have to practice their reli-
gion in fear that they will be arrested and imprisoned certainly
may be viewed as a blatant act of racial and religious discrimina-
tion. The treatment of the Native American Church by govern-
ment officials is a world-wide embarrassment for a country that
prides itself on its dedication to human rights. The proposed
amendment attempts to address this embarrassing lack of protec-
tion for a religion that pre-dates the formation of the United
118. Id. at 886 n.3.
119. Id. at 905-06.
120. Id. at 911-12. See also ANDERSON, supra note 102, at 165-66 ("[M]ost investiga-
tions have shown that peyote is not a dangerous narcotic."); STEWART, supra note 101, at 3
("Peyote is not habit forming, and in the controlled ambience of a peyote meeting it is in no
way harmful.").
121. The dissent noted that "[B]etween 1980 and 1987 the Drug Enforcement Agency
seized about 19 pounds of peyote. During the same period, the agency confiscated more than
15 million pounds of marijuana." Smith, 494 U.S. at 916 (citations omitted).
122. Oklahoma v. Kionute, No. CRF 91-80 (Okla. 1991).
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States, as well as the "discovery" of America by Christopher Co-
lumbus. The amendment will create a complete legislative exemp-
tion from all federal, state, and local laws proscribing the sacra-
mental use of peyote by Native Americans. 12 3 By doing so, the
proposed amendment would finally protect a traditional Indian re-
ligious practice that serves only as a positive force in Native Amer-
ican communities.
C. The Religious Use of Eagle Parts And Feathers
Native American traditional religious practitioners often rely
on natural substances such as wildlife, plants, and minerals for
their ceremonies." 4 In particular, many Indian religions consider
the use of eagle parts and feathers to be fundamental to the integ-
rity and sacredness of their ceremonies. 2 5 Indeed, some have even
compared the importance of the eagle feather in traditional Indian
religions to the importance of the cross in Christianity.' 6
The religious use of eagle parts and feathers has been cur-
tailed by federal efforts to protect an endangered species.' 7 In
1940, to protect the bald eagle from extinction, Congress passed
123. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 11, at 25-26.
124. "Native traditional religions are based on the natural environment. Their practi-
tioners rely on natural substances for their religious observances. Certain wildlife, plants
and minerals-which may be worn, carried or simply present-are considered sacred and
fundamental to the religious and ceremonial life." AIRFA REPORT, supra note 12, at 68.
125. For example, in the traditional religion of the Hopi Indians:
Eagle shrines are located throughout the Black Mesa area. The prayer feathers
that are so essential to our religious life and all our ceremonies must be Eagle
feathers. Without them, we cannot place and carry our sacred messages to the
spiritual world, we cannot hold the land for the Great Spirit. If the eagles are
forced to flee the heart of our Mother Earth because of man's activity, it will no
longer be possible for us to live in our spiritual and religious way. The life of all
people as well as animal and plant life depend on the Hopi spiritual prayers and
song. The world will end in doom.
Statement of Hopi Religious Leaders, Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28a,
Susenkewa v. Kleppe, 425 U.S. 903 (1976), cert. denied, Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520
F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975).
126. United States v. Thirty-Eight (38) Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F. Supp.
269, 276 (D. Nev. 1986) ("As the claimant's affidavits demonstrate, experts in comparative
religion have likened the status of the eagle feather in Indian religion to that of the cross in
the Christian faith.").
127. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986) (holding treaty rights to
hunt eagles on reservation lands abrogated by the Eagle Protection Act); United States v.
Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1976) (selling of eagle feathers by Native Americans to
non-Indians not a religious activity protected by the free exercise clause); Thirty-Eight (38)
Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F. Supp. at 269 (Eagle Protection Act does not violate
the free exercise clause on its face.). See generally Britt Banks, Comment, Birds of a
Feather: Cultural Conflict and the Eagle in American Society, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 639
(1988); Tina S. Boradransky, Comment, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of Feder-
ally Protected Wildlife, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 709 (1990).
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the Bald Eagle Protection Act, which forbids the killing, capture,
sale, or possession of bald eagles. 2 ' The Act was amended in 1962
to protect both bald and golden eagles because young bald eagles
can resemble golden eagles.129 In recognizing the importance of ea-
gle parts and feathers to Indian religion, the 1962 amendment also
provided that the Secretary of the Interior may authorize the tak-
ing of bald and golden eagles if the Secretary determines that such
taking "is compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle or the
golden eagle. '13 0
The 1962 amendment obviously allows the Secretary of the In-
terior great discretion. Unfortunately, the administrators of this
provision have been insensitive to the religious needs of American
Indians. In 1986, this pattern of administration was successfully
challenged as a violation of the free exercise clause in United
States v. Abeyta.13 1 In Abeyta, a New Mexico District Court re-
versed the criminal conviction of a Navajo Indian for killing a
golden eagle for religious ceremonies without a permit. The court
found that the Secretary of the Interior had issued many permits
to ranchers to kill eagles but had never issued any permits for In-
dian religious use, even though golden eagles were not an endan-
gered species and "[t]he uncontradicted testimony at trial estab-
lished that some eagles could be taken without harmful impact on
the remaining population. 1' 32 For these reasons, the court held
that the "utterly offensive and ultimately ineffectual" administra-
tive apparatus designed to issue permits violated the First Amend-
ment's free exercise clause.1 33
However, since the Abeyta decision was effectively overruled
by the Supreme Court's decisions in Lyng and Smith in 1988 and
1990, the Secretary of the Interior now has virtually complete dis-
cretion over whether to issue permits to Native Americans. Under
the proposed amendment, the Director of the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service must consult with Indian tribes and Native
American traditional leaders and develop a plan to reform the ex-
isting administrative process used to disburse eagle parts to Native
American traditional religious practitioners.134 Thus, the amend-
128. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1988).
129. 16 U.S.C. § 668a.
130. Id.
131. 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D. N.M. 1986).
132. Id. at 1307.
133. Id.
134. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 11, at 30-33. The amendment also recognizes that
tribal governments have the inherent right to administer a system for distributing eagle
parts found on tribal lands. Id. at 32-33. Finally, the amendment mandates that the Fish
[Vol. 54
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ment will help to ensure that the federal government becomes
more sensitive to the bona fide religious needs of traditional Native
American practitioners which are in danger after the Lyng and
Smith decisions.
D. The Religious Rights of Native American Prisoners
Religious practices are an excellent means to achieve one of
the goals of the American penal system-rehabilitating prisoners
into productive members of society.' 35 Indeed, the federal govern-
ment regularly supplies prisons with chaplains and religious ser-
vices paid for by taxpayers' money for most major religious denom-
inations.'38 Unfortunately, many prisoners who practice minority
religions have had to resort to litigation in order to practice their
religions in prison, relying primarily on the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment. 137
and Wildlife Service shall consult with Indian tribes and Native American traditional lead-
ers and develop a plan to evaluate the need for the existing system to include other birds,
animals, and plants which are held sacred by Native American practitioners. Id. at 33.
135. Treatment that degrades the inmate, invades his privacy, and frustrates the
ability to choose pursuits through which he can manifest himself and gain self-
respect erodes the very foundations upon which he can prepare for a socially use-
ful life. Religion in prison subserves the rehabilitative function by providing an
area within which the inmate may reclaim his dignity and reassert his
individuality.
Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (1969) (citations omitted).
Religion represents a rich resource in the moral and spiritual regeneration of man-
kind. Especially trained chaplains, religious instruction and counseling, together
with adequate facilities for group worship of the inmate's own choice, are essential
elements in the program of a correctional institution.
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS xxi (3d ed.
1966). See also C. Daniel Batson, Sociobiology and the Role of Religion in Promoting
Prosocial Behavior: An Alternative View, 45 J. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 1380
(1983); Mark E. Heintzelman & Lawrence A. Fehr, Relationship Between Religious Ortho-
doxy and Three Personality Variables, 38 PSYCHOL. REP. 756 (1976); Comment, The Reli-
gious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 812, 853-54 (1977).
136. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that the gov-
ernment's provision of prison chaplains does not violate the establishment clause).
137. Most prisoners who bring free exercise claims are members of minority faiths. For
instance, of the Supreme Court's three decisions dealing with free exercise claims by prison-
ers, two were brought by Muslim prisoners. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per
curiam); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). Another was brought by a Bud-
dhist prisoner. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
Before the 1960s, the courts traditionally adopted a "hands-off" policy to avoid or deny
review of prisoners' constitutional claims. See, e.g., Comment, Backwash Benefits For Sec-
ond Class Citizens: Prisoners' First Amendment and Procedural Due Process Rights, 46 U.
COLO. L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1975) (discussing hands-off policy); Note, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J.
506 (1963). By the late 1960s, however, the courts began to hear many complaints of prison-
ers, including First Amendment claims. See, e.g., Note, Religious Freedom in Prison: Free
Exercise vs. The Need for Prison Security, 36 ALB. L. REV. 416 (1972) (stating that hands-
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Due in part to widespread poverty, lack of adequate legal rep-
resentation, discrimination, and alcoholism, Native Americans are
disproportionately confined in America's prisons. 38 Many Indian
advocates and leaders believe that rehabilitating Indian prisoners
with traditional Indian religions is a key to strengthening Indian
tribal communities because traditional Indian religions commonly
foster a sense of pride in Indian heritage and culture and require a
sincere commitment to sobriety. 139 Because of the extreme impor-
tance of Native American religions to the rehabilitative process,
Native Americans, like other prisoners who practice less common
religions, have commonly asserted their constitutional right to
practice their traditional religions in prison."10
Courts have been generally receptive to Native Americans'
claims, requiring that prison administrators show a compelling in-
terest to justify regulations which abridge religious rights. For in-
stance, in Teterud v. Burns,14' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that long hair was a protected form of Indian religious expres-
sion which was not outweighed by the prison's asserted interest in
safety. 42 Also, in Indian Inmates of Nebraska Penitentiary v.
Gunter,'" a Nebraska District Court held that a Native American
prisoner had a right to access to a traditional religious leader."'
off doctrine eroded in 1960s). See also Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional
Reform: An Analysis of the Decline of the "Hands-Off" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REv. 795
(1977).
138. According to a 1991 prison population survey by the Native American Rights
Fund, the Federal Bureau of Prisons and many state prisons have disproportionately high
numbers of Indian inmates. (Survey on file at Native American Rights Fund). For instance,
Native Americans make up approximately 1.5 percent of the inmate population in federal
prisons although they make up less than .5 percent of the total United States population.
GETCHES AND WILKINSON, supra note 13, at 7. Similarly, Native Americans make up 34.7%,
31.7%, 24.9%, and 15.5% of the prison populations of Hawaii, Alaska, South Dakota, and
Montana, respectively, although they make up only 18.9%, 15.9%, 6.5%, and 4.7% of the
total populations of those states. Id.
139. In the 1970s, Native American leaders designed, developed, and implemented the
Swift Bird Project, a multi-million dollar corrections center for the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe, using Indian culture as a prime rehabilitation tool for Indian offenders transferred to
the Tribe from a five state area. See Elizabeth Grobsmith, The Impact of Litigation on the
Religious Revitalization of Native American Inmates in the Nebraska Department of Cor-
rections, in 34:124 PLAINS ANTHROPOLOGIST 135-47 (1989) (discussing the rehabilitative ben-
efits of Indian religion and culture).
140. Oversight Hearing, supra note 20 (testimony of Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Senior
Staff Attorney, Native American Rights Fund) ("About forty religion cases have been filed
since 1972 by Native American prisoners to protect their First Amendment rights, demon-
strating the pervasive nature of this problem on a national basis.").
141. 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
142. Id. at 362-63.
143. 660 F. Supp. 394 (D. Neb. 1987).
144. Id. at 400-01.
26
Montana Law Review, Vol. 54 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/2
ACCOMMODATING INDIAN RELIGIONS
However, the religious rights of prisoners were severely cur-
tailed by the 1987 Supreme Court case of O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz.1"5 In O'Lone, the Court abandoned the compelling inter-
est test and held that the government may abridge the religious
freedoms of prisoners if there is a reasonable relationship between
the abridgement and some justifiable government interest.14 The
Court identified four primary factors which are relevant in deter-
mining whether a reasonable relationship is present: (1) whether
the regulation has a logical connection to the penological interests
invoked to justify it; (2) whether the prisoners remain free to par-
ticipate in other religious activities; (3) whether the accommoda-
tion of the prisoner's asserted right would have an undesirable im-
pact on other inmates, on prison personnel, or on allocation of
prison resources generally; and (4) whether ready alternatives that
fully accommodate the prisoners' rights could be implemented at
de minimis cost to valid penological interests. 7 In subsequent de-
cisions, courts have used the third factor to restrict the rights of
those who practice minority religions which are often despised by
other inmates and prison personnel and do not fare well in the
"cost-benefit analysis" used to allocate religious rights among
prisoners.14
Under the O'Lone doctrine, Native American prisoners have
fared especially poorly. Most notably, in Iron Eyes v. Henry, 1 4  the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the forcible cutting of
an American Indian's, long hair did not violate the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment, even though the court had earlier
held in Teterud v. Burns5 ' that such conduct did violate the free
145. 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding a prison regulation that prohibited Muslim pris-
oners from attending a weekly congregational service (jumu'ah) of central religious impor-
tance to their Islamic faith). See generally Matthew P. Blischak, Note, O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz: The State of Prisoners' Religious Free Exercise Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 453, 458
(1988) (O'Lone "[c]reates a standard that improperly subjects the religious free exercise
rights of the incarcerated to the unquestioned judgment of prison administrators.").
Because O'Lone allows prison administrators such unbridled discretion, this article as-
sumes that the subsequent restrictions of the scope of the free exercise clause for private
citizens in Lyng and Smith do not affect the religious rights of prisoners. For example, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case challenging the constitutionality of prison regula-
tions, noted that Smith did not affect prisoners' free exercise rights, but instead brought
"the free exercise rights of private citizens closer to those of prisoners." Salaam v. Lockhart,
905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990).
146. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
147. Id. at 350-52.
148. See, e.g., Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69, 76 (2d. Cir. 1989) (rejecting Orthodox
Jewish inmate's challenge to one inch beard length regulation in part because of fear of
creating an "appearance of favoritism").
149. 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990).
150. 522 F.2d 357, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1975).
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exercise clause. In Iron Eyes, the court relied, in part, on the fact
that the prison had only a small number of Native Americans and
that special treatment of a minority religion would create resent-
ment and unrest among other prisoners."' In a strong dissent, the
author of the Teterud decision, Judge Heaney, characterized this
aspect of the majority's holding as giving effect to a "prisoners'
,veto" which "makes hollow the notion that prisoners retain reli-
gious rights." '162 Additionally, in Standing Deer v. Carlson,153 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that prison regulations ban-
ning the wearing of religious headgear by Native American prison-
ers in the prison dining hall did not violate the free exercise clause.
The court emphasized that the regulation was enacted in response
to prisoner complaints about dirty headgear in the dining hall and
that several prisoners had threatened to "take matters into their
own hands" unless prison officials took steps to alleviate the al-
leged unsanitary conditions.154 Thus, the courts in Iron Eyes and
Standing Deer took away religious rights important to Native
American prisoners-rights integral to curing chronic alcoholism
and creating a sense of pride in Indian heritage and cul-
ture-because of other inmates' religious and racial discrimination.
The proposed amendment provides that Native American
prisoners who practice a Native American religion shall have ac-
cess, comparable to the access afforded prisoners who practice
Judeo-Christian religions, to their Native American traditional re-
ligious leaders, to items and materials used in religious ceremonies,
and to Native American religious facilities. 5' Although the O'Lone
case still only allows prisoners minimal religious rights, the pro-
posed amendment would ensure that Native American religions
and prisoners receive equal treatment by prison administrators. In
particular, the proposed amendment would make it impossible for
prison administrators to restrict the religious rights of Native
Americans because there are only a small number of Native Ameri-
can prisoners or because of other prisoners' discrimination against
Native Americans-as was done in Iron Eyes and Standing Deer.
Therefore, by tying Native American religious rights to the rights
of Judeo-Christian or "majority" religions, the proposed amend-
151. Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 815.
152. Id. at 821-23 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
153. 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
154. Id. at 1527.
155. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 11, at 26. The proposed amendment also requires
the Attorney General to establish a commission to investigate whether the religious rights of
Native American prisoners in federal and state prisons are being abridged. DiscussoN
DRAFT, supra note 11, at 28-29.
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ment avoids the adverse consequences of O'Lone's third considera-
tion and protects traditional religions which are an integral part of
rehabilitating Indian prisoners into productive members of Indian
tribes.
III. PEYOTE WAY CHURCH OF GOD V. THORNBURGH: EXTENDING
MORTON V. MANCARI TO THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Recent federal laws and regulations protecting Native Ameri-
can religions, such as the AIRFA and the exemption to federal
drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote by members of the
Native American Church, are good examples of the federal govern-
ment's recent protection of Indian tribes as distinct cultural and
political entities. 156 This positive interpretation of the federal gov-
ernment's trust obligation to Indian tribes is a welcome relief to
Native Americans accustomed to federal policies designed to as-
similate "savage" and "uncivilized" tribal Indians into American
society:' 57
In the landmark 1974 case of Morton v. Mancari,'5 8 the Su-
preme Court explicitly embraced this new positive federal policy
by unanimously upholding an Indian hiring preference in the In-
dian Reorganization Act despite both constitutional and statutory
challenges. The Court held that although the Act singled out Na-
tive Americans for special protection, it did not violate the equal
protection clause.1 59 The Court reasoned that the Act was ration-
ally related to the fulfillment of Congress's unique trust obligation
to Indian tribes as it was designed to further Indian self-govern-
ment by making the Bureau of Indian Affairs more responsive to
the needs of its tribal constituency. 0
A. The Peyote Way Establishment Clause Test
In subsequent challenges to federal laws and regulations sin-
gling out Indians for special protection, courts have consistently
followed the Mancari decision.' For example, in 1991, the Fifth
156. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 33-48, 51-54 and accompanying text.
158. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
159. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "No State shall deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV §1. Although the Fourteenth Amendment by its own terms applies only to state gov-
ernments, the Supreme Court has applied the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal gov-
ernment through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
160. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552-55.
161. For example, in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v.
Thornburgh162 upheld an exemption to federal drug laws for the
sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native American
Church despite an equal protection clause challenge. In Peyote
Way, members of the Peyote Way Church of God, a non-Indian
church which uses peyote sacramentally, challenged the Native
American Church exemption in an attempt to broaden the exemp-
tion to cover their own church. The court followed Mancari, hold-
ing that the exemption did not violate the equal protection clause
since it preserved a religion of great importance to many Indian
tribes and thus was rationally related to the federal government's
fulfillment of its trust responsibility." 3
The court in Peyote Way, using an identical rationale, also re-
jected the claim that the exemption violated the establishment
clause of the First Amendment because it singled out one religion
for special treatment. The court extended the Mancari standard to
its establishment clause analysis because "[t]he federal govern-
ment cannot at once fulfill its constitutional role as protector of
tribal Native Americans and apply conventional separatist under-
standings of the establishment clause to that same relationship. "164
The court also held that "[t]he unique guardian-ward relationship
between the federal government and Native American tribes pre-
cludes the degree of separation of church and state ordinarily re-
quired by the First Amendment." '65 Thus, Peyote Way establishes
that federal actions, taken to preserve Indian religions which are
crucial to continuing tribal identity, do not violate either the equal
protection or the establishment clause.166
Indian Reservation, the Supreme Court upheld the immunity of reservation Indians from
state taxation. 425 U.S. 463, 480 (1976). Also, in Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors v. Pierce, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Indian bidding preferences under
the Indian Self-Determination Act. 694 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1982). See COHEN, supra
note 11, at 660-61 ("Laws protecting the separate status of tribal Indians do not violate the
principle of equal protection if they are rationally tied to the distinct constitutional status
of tribes and to the unique federal-tribal relationship."); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in
Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Gov-
ernment, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1009-14 (1981).
162. 922 F.2d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir. 1991).
163. Id. at 1216.
164. Id. at 1217.
165. Id.
166. Other federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have disposed of establishment clause
challenges to Native American religious exemptions by invoking the Mancari "rational rela-
tionship" standard. See Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, No. 91-1861 (1st
Cir. 1992) (exemption in Eagle Protection Act); United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 513
(1st Cir. 1984) (peyote exemption); Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d
1458, 1463 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (peyote exemption). Another federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rejected an establishment clause challenge to the federal peyote exemption by using a
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B. The Peyote Way Establishment Clause Test is Consistent
with First Amendment and Federal Indian Law Principles
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the government may
act to lift governmentally imposed burdens on religious practices
without violating the establishment clause because of the influence
of the free exercise clause.167 Similarly, under Mancari and its
progeny, the government may aid Indian tribes without violating
the equal protection clause because of the federal government's
trust responsibility to preserve and protect Indian tribes as dis-
tinct cultural and political entities.6 8 The Peyote Way decision
correctly relied upon the import of these two constitutional princi-
ples in upholding the federal peyote exemption, sensibly recogniz-
ing that it would be wholly inconsistent with the free exercise
clause and the federal government's trust responsibility to Indian
tribes to strike down government action designed to protect a Na-
tive American religious group from imminent extinction. Indeed,
such action would be tantamount to a governmental policy of "cal-
lous indifference" to the interests of a religious group, which has
explicitly been forbidden by the Supreme Court.6 9
C. The Amendment Passes Peyote Way Scrutiny
The proposed AIRFA amendment, like the challenged exemp-
tion for the sacramental use of peyote in Peyote Way, is designed
to protect traditional Indian religious practices integral to the con-
Fifth Amendment "substantive due process" establishment clause analysis. Kennedy v. Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415, 416-17 (9th Cir. 1972).
167. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (holding "alleviat[ing] significant governmen-
tal interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their reli-
gious missions" could be a permissible secular purpose); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 601 n.51 (1989) ("Government efforts to accommodate religion are permissible
when they remove burdens on the free exercise of religion."). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-4 (2d ed. 1988):
In attempting to distinguish between situations where accommodation of pro-
grams to religious needs has been held excessive and those where it has been held
permissible or even mandatory, it is helpful to posit a dichotomy between govern-
mental actions arguably (even if not beyond doubt) compelled by the free exercise
clause, and governmental actions supportive of religion in ways clearly not man-
dated by free exercise. Actions "arguably compelled" by free exercise are not for-
bidden by the establishment clause.
Id. at 1168 (emphasis added).
168. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
169. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). See TRIBE, supra note 167, at § 14-4
(stating that courts should not use the establishment clause to strike down attempts to
protect endangered minority religions, since this would turn the establishment clause into
an "awful engine of destruction").
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tinued existence of Indian tribes: worship at sacred sites, the sacra-
mental use of peyote, the religious use of eagle parts and feathers,
and worship by Native American prisoners. These practices are
currently threatened by governmental insensitivity in the wake of
the Supreme Court's decisions in Lyng, Smith, and O'Lone. Be-
cause the AIRFA amendment is rationally related to the fulfill-
ment of the federal government's historic trust responsibility to In-
dian tribes, it does not violate the establishment clause under the
Peyote Way doctrine.
IV. TRADITIONAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SCRUTINY
Today's generally accepted establishment clause test was first
set out in 1971 in the landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.10 In
Lemon, the Supreme Court held that a governmental action must
have a secular purpose, not have a primary effect that either ad-
vances or inhibits religion, and not foster an excessive governmen-
tal entanglement with religion. 7" The test remained essentially un-
changed until 1989, when the Supreme Court in County of
Allegheny v. ACL U 72 seemed to alter the Lemon test by replacing
the second prong of the test with the requirement that the govern-
ment not convey a "message of endorsement" of religion.1 73
A. The Amendment Should Be Judged By The Lemon Test
The Supreme Court did not apply the Lemon test in the 1982
case of Larson v. Valente,17 4 instead they applied "strict scrutiny"
to a Minnesota statute which discriminated against less well estab-
lished churches. 7 5 Subsequent cases, however, have limited Lar-
170. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
171. Id. at 612-13.
172. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
173. Id. at 595. Five justices of the Supreme Court joined Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion which effectively adopted the endorsement analysis by holding that since a nativity
scene in a county courthouse conveyed a message of endorsement for religion, it violated the
establishment clause. Id.
174. 456 U.S. 228, reh'g denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982).
175. Specifically, the Court reasoned that since the statute exempted only those reli-
gious organizations receiving more than 50% of contributions from members from certain
registration and reporting requirements, the statute effectively distinguished between well-
established churches with strong financial support from their members and new churches
lacking constituency or churches which favor public solicitation over reliance on financial
support from members. Id. at 253-54. In support of this reasoning, the Court cited several
statements by Minnesota state legislators which were recorded in the legislative history.
Referring to the legislation, one state senator explained that "what you're trying to get at
here is the people that are running around airports and running around streets and solicit-
ing people and you're trying to remove them from the exemption that normally applies to
religious organizations" while another stated "I'm not sure why we're so hot to regulate the
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son's strict scrutiny test to statutes which single out and discrimi-
nate against certain religious denominations and have not applied
the Larson test to laws which merely accommodate religious prac-
tices.17' For example, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,177 the Su-
preme Court applied the Lemon test to a law which exclusively
benefitted Sabbath observers-Christians and Jews-because the
law did not disadvantage faiths which do not observe the
Sabbath. 7 '
Similarly, the purpose of the AIRFA amendment is not to dis-
advantage other religions but rather to protect a minority religion
which is currently threatened by insensitive governmental actors.
Thus, like the statute challenged in Thornton which was specifi-
cally designed to accommodate Christianity and Judaism but not
to discriminate against any other religious groups, the proposed
amendment should be judged by the three-part Lemon test.
B. The Amendment Passes The Lemon Test
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that the proposed
amendment have a secular purpose. The AIRFA amendment has
at least five important secular purposes. First, because the absence
of protective legislation threatens Native American religions with
eventual extinction, the amendment protects these threatened mi-
nority religions in accordance with the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment.1 79 Second, the amendment ensures the contin-
ued existence of Indian tribes as political entities by removing gov-
Moonies anyway." Id. at 254-55.
176. Several commentators have noted this development. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note
167, at 1192-93 ("Perhaps the Lemon test applies to laws that alter the status quo in a way
that benefits some religions, as is most frequently the case in establishment clause cases,
while Larson applies to laws that alter the status quo in a way that burdens some reli-
gions."). See also Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Per-
missible Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L. J. 1127 (1990):
Though the Court has not explicitly applied heightened scrutiny to identify reli-
gious motivation underlying state decisions to advantage religion, it has applied
"strict scrutiny" to a statute that singled out and discriminated against certain
unpopular religious denominations [in Larson v. Valente]. Such scrutiny identifies
a purpose to disadvantage (i.e., persecute) those religions, which arguably would
also be a violation of the free exercise clause. In the accommodation context, how-
ever, there is seldom this question of outright religious persecution. Thus the
Court has not applied strict scrutiny to accommodationist laws.
Id. at 1133-34 n.41 (citations omitted).
177. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
178. Id. at 708-10.
179. Generally, governmental accommodation that is compelled by the free exercise
clause does not violate the establishment clause since such accommodation has a secular
goal. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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ernmentally imposed barriers to the practice of Indian religion in
accordance with the federal government's unique trust obligation
to Indian tribes.1 8° Third, the amendment fosters religious and cul-
tural diversity in our society, which Congress identified as a goal of
federal Indian policy when it passed the AIRFA in 1978. ' 81 Fourth,
the prisoners' rights section of the amendment is intended to help
rehabilitate prisoners into productive, well-adjusted 'members of
society, which has been recognized as a major goal of the American
penal system. 18 Finally, leaving sacred sites located on public land
pristine accords with the secular purposes underlying many federal
laws concerning historical sites, National Forests, and the environ-
ment generally. 183
The second prong of the original Lemon test requires that the
amendment not have a primary effect which either advances In-
dian religions or inhibits other religions.1 84 The Supreme Court has
held that this prong is not violated by statutes which may "reason-
ably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to
the free exercise of religion."' 85 Thus, since the primary effect of
the amendment is simply to allow Indian religions to continue to
exist by eliminating governmental barriers to worship, the amend-
ment does not run afoul of the second prong of the Lemon test.
Similarly, even if this prong was indeed modified by the Supreme
Court's decision in Allegheny, ' " the amendment does not convey a
180. See supra part III(C).
181. "America does not need to violate the religions of her native peoples. There is
room for and great value in cultural and religious diversity. We would be the poorer if these
American Indian religions disappeared from the earth." H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1262, 1264.
182. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
183. Federal statutes have created a public policy in favor of leaving certain public
lands untouched. See, e.g., Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986 & 1988); Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (1988);
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(f), 470h-2f (1988); National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988); Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1712(f), 1739(e) (1988). Indeed, out of the seven purposes of
National Forests identified in the National Forest Management Act of 1976-(1) timber
cutting and the preservation of (2) fish habitat, (3) wildlife habitat, (4) outdoor recreation,
(5) range, (6) watershed, and (7) wilderness-the only purpose which would be frustrated by
the non-destruction of Indian sacred sites is timber cutting. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) (1982 &
1988 & Supp. III 1991). This was noted in Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v.
Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
184. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
185. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989). Texas Monthly reaffirmed
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987), which held that the
the second prong of the Lemon test did not prevent government actions to remove govern-
mental burdens from a religious practice.
186. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
34
Montana Law Review, Vol. 54 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/2
ACCOMMODATING INDIAN RELIGIONS
message of official governmental endorsement for Indian religions.
Rather, the amendment merely conveys a message that a
threatened minority religion inextricably bound to the well-being
of Indian tribes needs protection from governmental actors.
The third prong of the Lemon test requires that the amend-
ment will not excessively entangle the government with Indian re-
ligions."' The Supreme Court has found excessive entanglement
where the statute or regulation in question would create a need for
complete governmental regulation, such as in Lemon, where the
Court believed that an aid program for parochial schools would
create the need for comprehensive monitoring by state administra-
tors.'88 Additionally, the Court has struck down legislation because
of excessive entanglement where religious bodies have been vested
with discretionary governmental powers, as in Larkin v. Grendel's
Den,"'89 where the Massachusetts statute at issue gave churches the
power to veto applications for liquor licenses within a 500 foot ra-
dius of a church.1 90
The sacred sites section of AIRFA would only entail a small
additional amount of consultation and cooperation between agency
officials and Native Americans, who already interact on a regular
basis due to the requirements of other federal statutes. Indeed, the
sacred sites section's requirement that federal land managers give
notice to and consult with Indian tribes and religious leaders
before beginning federal developments which may adversely affect
Indian religious practices pales in comparison to the many other
federal statutes which now require notice and consultation with va-
rious groups-including Indian tribes and religious leaders-before
federal developments may continue. 1 ' Therefore, since the negligi-
ble additional entanglement caused by the sacred sites section does
not rise to the level of entanglement struck down in Lemon or
Larkin, this section of the amendment passes the third prong of
the Lemon test.
The Supreme Court has also held that in certain circum-
stances, government accommodation of religion can reduce the
187. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
188. Id. at 622-23.
189. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
190. Id. at 123.
191. See, e.g., Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 4 7 0cc(c)
(1988); National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(f), 470h-2f (1988); Federal Cave
Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4305 (1988); Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988).
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amount of pre-existing government entanglement. For example, in
Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court held that tax exemptions for
religious organizations diminished existing governmental entangle-
ment with religion.19 2
Like the tax exemptions in Walz, the peyote, eagle feather,
and prisoners' rights sections of the proposed amendment would
actually reduce the amount of governmental entanglement with
Native American religious practitioners. The peyote section, in-
stead of allowing government actors to criminally prosecute the use
or possession of the peyote sacrament, removes the sacramental
use of peyote from the agenda of law enforcement agencies, thus
eliminating present government entanglement. Similarly, the eagle
feather section merely establishes a commission to reform the ex-
isting governmental procedures used to disburse eagle parts to Na-
tive American religious practitioners, thus minimizing unnecessary
interference with Native American religious rights. Finally, the
prisoners' rights section's extension of religious rights equivalent to
those of "mainstream religions" will entail a much smaller degree
of discretionary entanglement by prison officials than the present
system. Currently, prison officials decide requests for Native Amer-
ican religous exemptions from prison rules on a case by case basis,
weighing the goals of the AIRFA-to preserve and protect Indian
religions-against penal considerations. Thus, like the sacred sites
section of the proposed amendment, the peyote, eagle feather, and
prisoners' rights sections do not violate the third prong of the
Lemon test.
V. CONGRESS SHOULD PASS THE PROPOSED 1993 AIRFA
AMENDMENT
The 1993 amendment does not violate the establishment
clause when judged by either the Peyote Way standard or the
traditional Lemon test. Under a Peyote Way establishment clause
analysis, the amendment clearly is constitutional since it is
squarely rooted in, and arguably mandated by, the federal govern- -
ment's historic trust responsibility to Indian tribes, since the vital-
ity of Indian communities is so often dependent upon the health of
traditional Indian religions. The amendment passes the Lemon
test because it does not attempt to officially endorse or advance
Indian religions. Rather, it provides long-awaited protection for
traditional Indian religions that have been continually suppressed
by governmental authorities. Furthermore, the amendment recog-
192. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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nizes that these religions are in dire need of protective legislation,
especially after the evisceration of the free exercise clause in Lyng,
Smith, and O'Lone.
The suppression of traditional Indian religions began in 1492
when Christopher Columbus "discovered" the New World1 93 and
has continued for 500 years, ranging from the United States gov-
ernment's outright prohibition of Indian religious practices in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries to current government develop-
ments which threaten to destroy Indian sacred sites. Indian reli-
gion plays such an important role in Indian life that this suppres-
sion has caused great damage to Indian tribal societies. Because
the proposed 1993 AIRFA amendment represents an attempt to
remedy this damage, it finally fulfills the promise of AIRFA in
1978-that the United States government would "protect and pre-
serve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to be-
lieve, express, and exercise [their] traditional religions. 11 9 4 There-
fore, Congress should pass the amendment as soon as possible.
After 500 years of religious intolerance, protection for traditional
Native American religions is long overdue.
193. See KIRKPATRICK SALE, THE CONQUEST OF PARADISE 97 (1990) (On October 12,
1492, Columbus remarked that the Natives he encountered "would easily be made Chris-
tians, because it seemed to me that they had no religion.").
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
1993]
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